Berg-Karabach: Krieg oder Frieden?

Seit etlichen Wochen finden im Krisengebiet Schießereien zwischen Aserbaidschanern und Armeniern statt. Der britische Europaabgeordnete Charles Tannock schrieb: “This recent escalation smacks of the rising tensions before the Georgian-Russian war in 2008. After years with numerous smaller incidents … the frequency and gravity of the incidents slowly escalates … History appears to be repeating itself.”

Die internationale Gemeinschaft zeigte sich besorgt. Die US-Außenministerin Hillary Clinton beklagte Anfang Juni in Jerewan “the senseless deaths of young soldiers and innocent civilians‘. Und dann: “The use of force will not resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and therefore force must not be used … We are calling on everyone to renounce force as well as refraining from violence.” (RFE/RL Armenia Report, 06.06.2012)

Einen Tag danach ergänzte sie in Baku: “I am deeply concerned about the danger of escalating tension, which could have unpredictable and disastrous consequences … This cycle of violence and retaliation must end, and everyone should work to keep the peace and comply with the obligations under the 1994 ceasefire agreement.”

Bei der Sitzung der Minsk Gruppe am 18. Juni 2012, an der auch die Außenminister Armeniens und Aserbaidschan teilnahmen, war die Eskalation im Berg-Karabach-Konflikt im Fokus. In der Presseerklärung heißt es u.a.: „The Co-Chairs also reiterated deep concern over recent incidents along the front lines and stressed the need to respect the 1994 ceasefire agreement.  The Foreign Ministers expressed their determination to continue working with the Co-Chairs to reach a peaceful settlement, and their readiness to carry out confidence-building measures that could improve the atmosphere for negotiations.”

Berg-Karabach war auch beim Treffen der Präsidenten der USA, Russlands und Frankreichs in Los Cabos, Mexiko, ein Thema. In ihrer Gemeinsamen Erklärung vom 19. Juni 2012 heißt es u.a.:

„We call upon the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to fulfill the commitment in their January 23, 2012 joint statement at Sochi to ‘accelerate’ reaching agreement on the Basic Principles for a Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.  As evidence of their political will, they should refrain from maximalist positions in the negotiations, respect the 1994 ceasefire agreement, and abstain from hostile rhetoric that increases tension.  We urge the leaders to be guided by the principles of the Helsinki Final Act – particularly those relating to the non-use of force or the threat of force, territorial integrity, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples – and the elements of a settlement outlined in our countries‘ statements at L’Aquila in 2009 and Muskoka in 2010. Military force will not resolve the conflict and would only prolong the suffering and hardships endured by the peoples of the region for too long.  Only a peaceful, negotiated settlement can allow the entire region to move beyond the status quo toward a secure and prosperous future. Our countries will continue to work closely with the sides, and we call upon them to make full use of the assistance of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs as mediators. Our countries will continue to work closely with the sides, and we call upon them to make full use of the assistance of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs as mediators.  However, peace will depend ultimately upon the parties‘ willingness to seek an agreement based on mutual understanding, rather than one-sided advantage, and a shared vision of the benefits that peace will bring to all their peoples and to future generations.”

Die möglichen Folgen sind oft beschrieben worden, der Europaabgeordnete Charles Tannock tut es ein weiteres Mal: „Also knowing the complex local geography and huge natural resources, it is impossible to predict whose troops would finally end up exactly where. Only one thing is certain: the human tragedy and economic costs would dwarf anything seen in Europe, at least for the last 20 years since the Balkan wars. To add to further turmoil as the world is facing an economic slump, with the eurozone crisis and US and Chinese growth dampening, the expected collapse of Azerbaijani oil and gas supplies would cause a rapid rise in world-wide crude prices and strangle any green shoots hopes for renewed global economic growth.”

Die möglichen Ziele bei einem Krieg und die wirtschaftlichen Folgen brachte Emil Souleimanov in „THE PROSPECTS FOR WAR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH“ in Erinnerung: „In fact, an attack in the Gazakh-Tavush area seems to host a number of potential military advantages for both Armenian and Azerbaijani strategists in case of renewed fighting. For Armenians, the Azerbaijani oil and natural pipelines running through this part of Azerbaijan to Georgia and then to Turkey are of outmost importance. Revenues from export of oil and natural gas make up as much as 85 percent of Azerbaijan’s budget, and the possible destruction of these pipelines could cause serious problems for the Azerbaijani economy. Yet in military terms, using border troops to advance to this area would make little sense as Armenians possess a range of high-quality missile systems of Russian production that would relatively easily neutralize Azerbaijan’s pipelines in case of a renewed war.”

Die Frage ist, ob dieser Konflikt auf Armenien und Aserbaidschan beschränkt bleiben wird. Giorgi Lomsadzes Einschätzung lässt das Schlimmste befürchten:

“Russian jets have been busy drilling in Armenian airspace, and, in March, Moscow held war games in Gyumri. Earlier on, the head of the Collective Security Treaty Organization — a Russian response to NATO — said that the Moscow-led alliance will protect Armenia from enemy attacks. ‘If unfriendly actions are taken against Armenia, all member states will provide relevant assistance to Armenia,’ pledged CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha … But as the 2008 war with Georgia showed, if Russia wants to get involved, it will — and the results can be disastrous … While, like its fellow go-betweens, it espouses belief in a peaceful resolution, its buildup in Armenia suggests another belief as well — speak softly, but carry a big stick.”

Die aktuelle Eskalation geht von Baku aus. Die „Heimführung“ Berg-Karabachs mit kriegerischen Mitteln wird allenfalls zu einem Flächenbrand in der Region führen und einem wirtschaftlichen Niedergang, auch Aserbaidschans. Ist es das, was Alijew will? Oder soll das eine Ablenkung für sein korruptes und diktatorisches Regime sein? Dank dem European Song Contest (ESC) weiß die internationale Öffentlichkeit besser über Aserbaidschan Bescheid, allerdings nicht so, wie Alijew es sich gewünscht hatte (s. die internationale Berichterstattung zum ESC 2012 in Baku).

Was kann die internationale Gemeinschaft gegen diese Eskalation tun? Der britische Europaabgeordnete Charles Tannock hat konkrete Vorstellungen:

“The EU should clearly threaten sanctions against anyone unilaterally using disproportionate force in this conflict, and we must insist on the removal of snipers and on having EU observers along the line of contact and the state borders. Incidentally, Armenia has already agreed to this.”

Before signing the next oil trade treaty with Baku, this should be the EU condition, or we might soon have very different prices to pay for oil and more importantly a tragic human catastrophe in Europe’s east with large-scale casualties. In addition, there could be large flows of refugees heading in our direction with all that this might mean in economic terms in terms of additional burdens on our already stretched public resources.“

Sanktionen hat der Westen Aserbaidschan – im Gegensatz zu Weißrussland u.a. – noch nie angedroht. Auch die Unterzeichnung der nächsten Erdöl- oder Erdgasverträge mit Baku an Bedingungen zu knüpfen ist neu. Nur: Ist der Westen auf seiner Suche nach Energiequellen, die nicht unter russischer Kontrolle stehen, dazu überhaupt bereit? Die bisherige Erfahrung spricht eher dagegen.